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Abstract 
Credit Card markets are special kind of market which is called as Two-Sided Markets in economics literature. In 
these markets there are two sides which benefit from the number of subscribers on other sides. Although scholars and 
economists has given importance and examined two-sided markets since the beginning of 21th century Turkish 
scholars have not interested much about these markets. We studied Turkish Credit card market by using Two-sided 
markets approach and also we aimed to contribute literature that is poor about Turkey Two-Sided Markets. We 
defined actors and competition structure in Turkish credit card markets and explained profit functions of them and set 
profit maximizing problems.  
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1. Introduction 
With the spread of computers and internet we have witnessed a revolution in financial markets. Credit 
cards became one of the major payment instruments thanks to the IT technology. Credit card market has a 
unique structure called two-sided network market in economic literature from which both consumers and 
merchants benefit. In this market, number of consumers and merchants who are willing to use and accept 
the credit card as a payment instrument is important for other side. Generally speaking, there is a positive 
network externality in this market which means values of credit cards are dependent on the number of 
actors using or accepting it.  
The article proceeds in three steps: The first step is the review of economic literature on two-sided 
network markets.  Here, we explained structure and general properties of market; strength and weakness 
of banks in competition. Then, with references to economic literature on the subject we discussed Turkish 
credit card market and competition.  We explained profit functions of actors and set profit maximizing 
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problems of them. Lastly, we put forth possible movements of actors and determinants of the competition 
in Turkish credit card market. 
2. Literature Review 
Network markets and externalities are becoming challenging subjects with the emergence of new 
economy term (Top and Dilek, 2011 , 2011; Top, Dilek and Colakoglu; 2011). 
value of a good increase as the number of consumers, who use it increases. Thus every user of a product 
has something on the value of that product for others. This is called positive network externality. Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) establish three conditions of positive network externality as a) direct effect b) indirect 
effect and c) availability of post purchase system. Direct effects are valid when the quality of a good 
depends on network size. For example; telephone becomes more and more useful for consumers as the 
number of users increases. The higher number of other users, the higher amount and variety of 
complementary goods and this is called indirect effect. Higher numbers of mobile phone subscribers lead 
to more software options which are adaptable to mobile phone technology. Third, the availability of post 
purchase system depends on the number of total users. As the mobile phone users increase, the number 
and availability of mechanics and other post purchase services increases as well. 
Credit card market is special kind of network market that is called two-sided market (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003; Roson, 2005: 142). Consumers decide to apply for membership for a credit card according 
to the number of merchants who accept it as a payment instrument. On the other side, merchants take into 
consideration the number of consumers who want to use it in payments. In brief, these markets consist of 
two distinct types of users who provide benefits from transaction and interaction with opposite sides (Bolt 
and Tieman, 2005: 3). Other most common examples of two-sided markets in economic literature are 
video games, browsers, operating systems, portals, newspapers, (charge free) TV networks, shopping 
malls, dating clubs (Rochet and Tirole, 2003: 993-994) and scholar journals (Schonfeld, 2008). According 
to Roson (2005, 143), Interest for two-sided and multi-sided markets has been increased after the popular 
studies of Rochet and Tirole (2002 and 2003) and Armstrong (2004). 
Another aspect of two-sided markets is that platforms should decide not only according to the amount 
of price but also according to the type of price. A platform trying to maximize its profit may price one 
part of market above marginal cost while pricing the other part under marginal cost (Bolt and Tieman, 
2005a: 3; Armstrong and Wright, 2007: 355; Economides and Tag, 2007: 8). It is even possible like in the 
examples of internet search engines and TV channels that one part of market even is not given a price 
(Argentasi and Filisstrucchi, 2005: 2), firms can use skewed pricing (Bolt and Tieman, 2005b). Parker 
and Alystne (2005) investigated which part of market should a firm seeking to maximize its profit 
subsidize while making profit on the other side. Schindler and Schjelderup (2010) found under no tax 
circumstances network externality between two groups cause a different price than marginal cost. Scholar 
studying the subject with a focus on industrial economics and micro economics analyze credit card 
markets and the competition in these markets in their studies. (Chakravorti and Emmons, 2001; Rochet 
and Tirole, 2008; Schmalensee, 2002). 
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Although much theoretical progress has been made about network economics and multi-sided markets 
in international industrial and micro economics area, Turkish economists and scholars did not show 
enough interest. So, in literature the studies that investigate Turkish credit card market by looking through 
networks and platform economics are scant. The aim of this study is to encourage scholars about studies 
about two-sided markets and also form a basic model about Turkish credit card market. 
3. Credit Card Market As Two-Sided Market Approach 
to investigate credit card market as an 
example of two-sided market. Rochet and Tirole (2003: 550) studied credit card market by using two 
sided-market approach. They explain three rules in their study: first is interchange fee determined by 
platform management and paid to the issuer by acquirer. Second rule is Honor-all-cards rule that all 
affiliated merchant and issuing consumer s obligation to accept the cards they are using. No-Surcharge is 
the third rule which means no merchant can charge any additional costs to the consumer for paying with 
credit card.  
Rochet and Tirole (2002: 554) analyzed classical payment card market and draw the figure that 
summarizes the structure of market. We will use this figure for analyzing Turkish Credit card market 
later.  
 
Figure 1. Credit Card and Payment Card Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rochet and Tirole (2002: 554). 
 
As it is seen in Figure 1, there are five actors in credit card markets. Relations between customer and 
merchant are conducted by two financial institutions called issuer and acquirer. While these financial 
instutions are not banks abroad in Turkey they are all banks. In two-sided markets some actors may not 
prefer to settle for one network. For example cardholders can use more than one credit card or users can 
Pays p-m (m:discount) 
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Pays p+f ( customer fee) 
Pays p-a (a: interchange fee) 
Sells good at price p 
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install multiple Internet browsers in their computers etc.  This is called multihoming in literature. If 
market actors on contrary prefer just one platform this is called singlehoming  (Roson, 2005: 151). 
 
4. Actors of Turkish Credit Card Market  
payment method instead of 
cash 
card markets. To meet this necessities new Bank Cards and Credit Cards Law no:5464 put into force on 1 
March 2006. (Karahan, 2011: 100). On consume  side use of credit cards as payment instrument have 
some opportunities like paying in installment, bonus points, slow payment etc. Number of credit card 
transactions and their amounts according to BKM are given in Table1. Because date of the last published 
data is January 2012 we chose January.  For not to take into consideration time effect, January data are 
taken into consideration for all the years.  
 
Table1. Number and amount of credit card transactions. 
Period Number of Transactions Amount of Transactions (milion TL) 
 Shopping Withdrawing 
cash 
Total Shopping Withdrawing 
cash 
Total 
2002 January 39.534.289 3.197.071 42.731.360 1.225,03 181,99 1.407,03 
2003 January 55.155.126 3.173.185 58.328.311 2.216,52 225,49 2.442,01 
2004 January 78.073.924 3.885.111 81.959.035 3.687,06 417,41 4.104,48 
2005 January 95.424.405 4.653.734 100.078.139 5.204,46 548,15 5.752,61 
2006 January 103.987.310 4.326.947 108.314.257 6.604,48 658,19 7.262,68 
2007 January 96.705.023 5.366.332 102.071.355 8.241,80 987,72 9.229,52 
2008 January 120.230.131 7.090.029 127.320.160 11.709,09 1.393,40 13.102,50 
2009 January 132.325.698 8.021.090 140.346.788 13.273,11 1.765,47 15.038,58 
2010 January 150.162.575 7.152.159 157.314.734 15.161,55 1.542,69 16.704,25 
2011 January 168.145.427 7.430.520 175.575.947 18.369,29 1.880,72 20.250,02 
2012 January 188.403.478 7.563.272 195.966.750 23.606,75 2.087,86 25.694,62 
Source: http://www.bkm.com.tr/istatistik/kredikarti_yurtici_issuer_islemleri.asp (date:23.02.2012) 
 
It can be seen in the Table 1 amount of shopping transactions are growing every year and annual 
growth rates are usually above %20. Until 2005 growing rates were higher than %40. However growing 
rates have been decreased to %20 since 2005. The similar results are valid for withdrawing cash amounts 
except 2010. Because in 2010 withdrawing cash amounts decreased according to 2009. In shortly, usage 
of credit card both as a shopping and withdrawing cash tool usually have been increased since 2002. For 
that reason Turkish credit card market became more important search area for scholars. 
 
A) Platforms: They are institutions which coordinates interactions and set interchange fees. In US, 
MasterCard and Visa are non-profit associations owned by more than 6000 financial institutions. 
However American Exprees is a for profit closed system that works similar to Visa and MasterCard 
(Rochet and Tirole, 2002). Platforms compete with each other on interest rates, billing cycles, credit terms 
or cardholders and merchants mark preferences (Chakravorti and Roson, 2004). 
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Contrary to USA, in Turkey the amount of interchange fee paid to issuer by acquirer is determined by 
BKM. BKM was found by 13 private and state banks in 1990 to establish credit card standards and rules. 
realized by BKM. Thus, activities 
like developing procedures between banks, making domestic regulations and decisions to obtain 
standardization are performed in one place. Domestic credit card market of Turkey is not competitive but 
a monopolistic one. (http://www.bkm.com.tr/kurulus.aspx, date: 14.11.2011).  
Visa, MasterCard, JCB, Diners Club etc are used as international payment systems in Turkey. BKM 
 pricing and clearance with these International institutions. According to BKM 
(Interbank Card Center) five platforms in Turkey are Visa, MasterCard, AMEX, JCB and Diners Club 
(http://www.bkm.com.tr/odeme-sistemleri.aspx).  
 
Table 2. Visa and MasterCard Subscription Numbers 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Visa 9.572.460 13.202.147 15.989.986 17.800.385 20.878.744 24.332.198 25.201.351 27.378.115 
MasterCard 10.255.667 13.450.664 13.963.095 14.623.148 16.416.829 18.824.985 18.712.739 19.125.697 
Others  35.040 28.317 25.162 9.800 39.606 236.842 478.524 452.312 
Source: http://www.bkm.com.tr/yillara-gore-istatistiki-bilgiler.aspx (Date: 05.01.2012) 
 
However Visa and MasterCard systems have market power and have got most of the market share. 
Table 2 shows data about the competition between Visa and MasterCard. In 2003 the market share of 
MasterCard was higher than Visa. First Visa catched MasterCard in 2004 and then passed it. The market 
share of Visa has been higher than MasterCard since 2005. According to 2010 data Visa has 
approximately % 58 market shares in Turkish credit card market. 
 
B) Issuers and Acquirers: Merchant and cardholders are joint with each other by financial 
institutions that are called as issuers and acquirers. In this market cardho  and 
mercha . The fee that is paid by acquirer to issuer is called interchange fee 
and it is set by BKM in Turkey. Interchange fees are determined in some countries by networks (Master-
Visa), while in some countries institutions like banks association determine these fees. (G e 
 2011: 180). If one institution is both, an issuer and an acquirer at the same time, then 
transaction costs will be minimum. 
leader. Garantib
 Total market share of first four issuer fell to 67.4 in 2008 from 
69.5 in 2007 and then again it fell to 65.4 in 2010. (According to the m-firm concentration ratio which 
measures competition in the market m firms total market share is taken into consideration although there 
is no rule m generally accepted is four in scientific studies) (Tirole, 1989: 221)). We can deduce from the 
falling of market shares of the first four banks that competition in the credit card market has grown. 
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they prefer to increase the number of installment payments, increase advertising expenses, etc (Karahan, 
2011: 108). 
 
Table.3 Market shares of banks in Credit Card Market according to the amounts.  
Rank 2004 % 2007 % 2008  % 2010 % 
1 
Kredi 
22,4 
Kredi 
23,6 
Kredi 
21,0 
Kredi 
18,7 
2 Garanti 20,4 Garanti 20,1 Garanti 19,7 Garanti 17,5 
3 Akbank 13,7 Akbank 13,8 Akbank 13,9 Akbank  15,1 
4  11,8  12  12,8 Finansbank 14,1 
5 HSBC 7,2 Finans 9 Finans 9,9  12,1 
6 Finans 6,7 HSBC 6,9 HSBC 6,7 HSBC 5,4 
7  4,3 Fortis 2,2 Citibank 2,5  3,2 
8 Fortis 3,1  2  2,2 Ziraat 2,7 
9 Deniz 2,1 Citibank 1,9 Ziraat 2 Denizbank 2,3 
10 Ziraat 2 Denizbank 1,7 Fortis 1,9 Citibank 1,6 
Source :  :5, BDDK, December, 2010. 
http://www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/turkce/Raporlar/Bankacilikta_Yapisal_Gelismeler/9886bankacilikta_yapisal_gelismeler_sayi5.pdf 
 
Issuers get customer fee, limit access fee and if the customers exceed payment period also interest 
revenues from cardholders. They also get Interchange fee from acquirer instutions. In return they carry 
transaction cost and fraudulency risk. Because of the increase in the outstanding credit card debts after 
2005, in 2006 law no.5464 put into force in Turkey and gave authority of determining ceiling interest 
rates for credit cards to the TCMB. (Aysan, 2011: 10).  
While in some countries acquirer and issuer institutions exists independently of each other in credit 
card markets we find banks give both issuer and acquirer services to the customer in Turkish credit card 
market. Thus transaction costs of bank
intermediation operations stop. This is called On-Us operations in banking literature (Aysan, 2011: 12). 
 
C) Cardholders : Chakravorti (2003: 52) investigated cardholders in two main groups. First 
consumer group is called revolver, this group do
term credit tool. Second group, pays it debts in time and called convenience user. 
In Turkey, credit cards have no collateral and credit card debts are unsecured. Thus they are riskier 
compared to other type of credits. Generally rate of past due loans are higher in this credit segment. 
than other credits (Aysan, 2011: 17). 
Due to the rise in the number of credit card defaults in 2006 following law no 5464 an amnesty put in 
force and users under execution by creditors got a once easy payment for their credit card debts (Karahan, 
2011: 104). Maximum interest rates for revolver consumers are announced by Central Bank of the 
republic of Turkey. 
 
D) Merchant: Chakravorti and To (2007), claims when with the accept of credit card membership, 
sales increase member merchants bear higher discounts lightly. Rochet and Tirole (2003) claims when 
numbers of member merchants are high enough cardholders benefit from their cards more. When there 
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5.  
In this section we are going to take hypothetical market model simi
and reveal market actors profit functions. We already mentioned two types of  card holders first of which 
is revolvers, cardholders using their credit cards as long term credit tools and convenience users who use 
their cards for shopping without advantage of credit.  Therefore we are assuming two types of 
cardholders. Let one of the cardholders be a revolver who bought something n period ago from price p1 
and a convenience user who has just bought from price p2. While mark
payment will be p1(1+i)n.  Because second cardholder is not defaulted his price will only be p2. Both 
cardholders U1 and second 
cardhold U2.  
card. Cardholders profit function is (1). Of course both of them want to maximize their profits. 
fpUMax
fipUMax n
22
11 )1(
                     (1) 
Because in Turkey banks are both issuer and acquirer, transaction costs and interchange fees disappear 
and institutions like BKM that determine interchange fees become unnecessary.  Thus, bank gets from 
first cardholder 11 )1( pip
n interest rate revenue and from both cardholder membership charge (f) and 
from merchant discount (m) revenue and profit function will be sum of them. If we assume that public 
authority limit interest rate with i0 then we will have a constraint. If m is fixed, independent from prices 
then profit function of banks will be (2a) 
11 )1(2max pipfm
n
                  (2a) 
Constraint: i<=i0 
If m is determined as percentage of prices (advalorem) then profit function of banks will differ and be 
(2b). 
1121 )1(2)(max pipfppm
n
                  (2b) 
Constraint: i<=i0 
 
Merchant will get price of good p1 he has sold to first cardholder and p2 from the second cardholder 
and he will pay m discount rate to the bank. If m is determined advalo
profit function will be (3a).  
))(1( 21 ppmMax
                  (3a)
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If m  
mppMax )( 21                    (3b) 
As a result (1), (2a), (2b), (3a) and (3b) are profit functions of market actors in Turkish credit card market.  
Conclusion:  
Two-
micro economists and market researchers. Credit card markets are one example of two-sided markets and 
studying them as a two-sided market became interesting subjects in the economics literature. Although 
there are many studies about foreign credit card markets in literature, finding studies that search Turkish 
credit card market as a two-sided market approach is hard.  
independent institutions in the world, banks undertake both functions in Turkey. Thus interchange fee and 
instutions determining this fee become unnecessary in the market. By the same reason discounts in the 
transaction costs are seen in the market. It is observed that studies on the Turkish credit card markets are 
 we showed the 
profit functions of actors when issuer and acquirer are same institutions. Thus we paved the way for 
micro-based further advanced studies that will investigate Turkish credit card market as a two sided 
market approach in detail.  
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